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VER the past ten years, Mexico has enacted legislation privatiz-
ing many of its formerly state-owned industries. Nevertheless,
Mexico has continually rejected legislation that would privatize
its oil behemoth, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex). This article discusses the
history of Mexico's oil industry, the successful privatization of Argen-
tina's formerly state-owned oil company, Yacimientos Petroleros Fiscales
(YPF), and why Mexico, like Argentina, should privatize its oil industry.
II. HISTORY OF MEXICO'S OIL INDUSTRY
Before Mexico's nationalist movement, Mexico's laws granted land-
owners ownership rights in oil found beneath their land.' Consequently,
by the early 1900s, many foreigners began investing in Mexico and its oil.2
As a result, Mexico's oil proceeds ran mostly to foreign investors and
away from Mexico's citizens. 3 But the idea that foreign investors were
becoming rich off of Mexico's natural resources promptly fueled a nation-
alist movement. 4 In response, Mexico ratified article 27 of the 1917 Con-
stitution, repealing the former law and declaring subsurface minerals to
be the property of Mexico's government.5
After article 27 was ratified, Mexico merged its oil industry into a sin-
gle state-owned entity that subsequently became Pemex.6 In light of the
circumstances surrounding its formation, Pemex became a symbol of
Mexico's sovereignty and economic independence from foreign
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1. Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Prospect for Further Energy Privatization in Mexico, 36
TEX. INT'L L.J. 75, 76 (2001) (discussing Mexico's Mining Law of 1884).
2. J. Keith Russell, Comment, The Time is Now for Full Privatization of Pemex, 20
Hous. J. INT'L L. 173, 186-87 (1997) (describing foreign investment as "a massive
influx").
3. Id. at 187.
4. Id. ("Expropriation of the oil companies was thus seen as a national defense
against capitalistic foreign threats to Mexican sovereignty.")
5. Murphy, supra note 1, at 76.
6. Russell, supra note 2, at 187.
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ownership. 7
In the 1990s, however, a movement toward trade liberalization began
with the privatization of many of Mexico's formerly state-owned indus-
tries and the adoption of the North America Free Trade Agreement. 8
Accordingly, a movement toward the privatization of Pemex has gained
momentum as well. 9 Among those who support privatization of Pemex
are Mexico's former President, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce, his successor, Vi-
cente Fox, and high-ranking Pemex officials. 10 Because of their efforts,
Mexico amended its petroleum laws so private entities can "transport,
store, and distribute natural gas, and.., build, operate, and own [natural
gas] pipelines and [natural gas] installations" through multiple service
contracts. 1
Despite the momentum privatization has gained, Mexican nationalists,
including many Congress members and union officials, despise the idea of
Pemex's privatization. 12 Such staunch opposition has caused Mexico to
continually reject legislation intended to solidify Pemex's privatization. 13
In addition, certain Congress members have criticized the use of multi-
ple service contracts, despite their limited use in natural gas production.
14
Specifically, these Congress members argue that multiple service con-
tracts violate article 27 by allowing foreign companies to benefit in the
production of subsurface minerals.1 5 Conversely, proponents of multiple
service contracts contend that these contracts are constitutional because
Pemex retains both ownership of the gas and control of the projects.1 6
Regardless of the merits of either argument, Mexico has continued to
7. Id. at 188.
8. See Edward C. Snyder, Comment, The Menem Revolution in Argentina: Progress
Toward a Hemispheric Free Trade Area, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 95, 96-99 (1994)
(describing NAFIA and Mexico's privatization efforts).
9. See Michael Tanzer, The International Oil Industry: Recent Changes and Their Im-
plications for Mexico, 46 MONTHLY REV. 2, 3-4 (1994) (explaining the pressure
major oil companies are placing on Mexico to privatize Pemex); Pemex May Offer
Shares, OIL DAILY, June 3, 2004 (demonstrating Pemex officials' desire to privatize
through a limited stock offering).
10. See Main Opposition Party Rejects Fox's Plans for Oil Industry, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2005 (explaining that President Vicente Fox and Pemex officials argue that foreign
capital is necessary to fully exploit offshore reserves); Murphy, supra note 1, at 77
(discussing the Zedillo administration's efforts).
11. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 77.
12. See George W. Grayson, Why Mexican Labor Fights a Petrochemical Selloff, WALL
ST. J., June 14, 1996, at A15 (demonstrating labor opposition to privatization);
Joseph Contreras et al., Energy Crunch: Is Latin America Too Protective of its
Power Sector?, NEWSWEEK INT'L, May 31, 2004 (stating that the Mexican Congress
blocked initiatives to open up Mexico's petrochemical industries to private
investment).
13. See Main Opposition Party Rejects Fox's Plans for Oil Industry, supra note 10;
Pemex May Offer Shares, supra note 9.
14. See Pemex Runs into Senate Trouble Over New Contracts, ENERGY COMPASS, Jan.
17, 2002.
15. See id. (stating Mexican Senate members want to prevent illegal privatization).
16. Bob Williams, Pemex Official: Mexican MSC Round Just First Step, OIL & GAS J.,
July 21, 2003, at 34; Contreras et al., supra note 12 (stating that "[t]he physical
assets still belong to the government").
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allow Pemex to issue multiple service contracts, and foreign companies
continue to participate and benefit in the development of Mexico's natu-
ral gas reserves. 17
Although Mexico has allowed foreign companies to participate in natu-
ral gas production through multiple service contracts, Pemex has not is-
sued multiple service contracts for oil production.' 8 One obvious reason
why Pemex has been reluctant to issue multiple service contracts for oil
production is that Mexico views oil as a symbol of its sovereignty and
economic independence.1 9 Another reason is that multiple service con-
tracts are still under a tremendous amount of scrutiny themselves.20 In
essence, Pemex is reluctant to issue oil-related multiple service contracts
because it fears that doing so would create a public uproar, enabling na-
tionalists to eliminate multiple service contracts altogether.
III. PRIVATIZATION OF ARGENTINA'S OIL INDUSTRY
Argentina's privatization of YPF, its formerly state-owned oil com-
pany, is a prime example of the long-term benefits of privatization. For
nearly eight decades, Argentina's government owned and operated the
nation's oil supply under a state-controlled entity, YPF.21 Like Pemex,
YPF was inefficient, undercapitalized, and the cause of a national budget
deficit.2 2 Finally, in 1992, the Argentine government privatized YPF and
adopted new legislation to support the process. 23
Within one year, YPF's privatization was almost complete, and Argen-
tina's oil industry became a free market economy.24 Yet, YPF was care-
fully privatized by a process that began with a presidential decree,
privatizing "all secondary, marginal-production areas and offer[ing] pri-
vate companies [partnership opportunities] with YPF in primary areas. '25
The same decree made crude oil, extracted from both primary and secon-
dary areas, freely marketable.26 Government price controls were eradi-
cated, which enabled free market forces to determine oil prices. 27 Export
17. See Pemex Awards Olmos Block to Lewis Energy Company, Bus. NEWS AMERI-
CAS, Jan. 16, 2004; Pemex Receives Two Bids for Pandura-Anahuac Block, Bus.
NEWS AMERICAS, Oct. 26, 2004.
18. See Terrence Murray, Mexico's Fox to Push for Private-Sector Gas Development,
INT'L OIL DAILY, Sept. 13, 2005; David Knapp, Fox Tries to Ease Tax Burden on
Faltering Pemex, OIL DAILY, Aug. 20, 2004.
19. See Burlington Looks at Burgos Basin Natural Gas Reserves, ENERGY DAY, July
18, 2002, at 3.
20. Main Opposition Party Rejects Fox's Plans for Oil Industry, supra note 10; Peter
Gall, Oil Firms Line Up to Hear Mexico Pitch Multiple-Service Contracts, INT'L
OIL DAILY, June 19, 2002.
21. Interview with Pedro Nicholas Baridon, Vice President, World Petroleum Con-
gress (2003), http://www.world-petroleum.org/first/first2003/48-49.pdf.
22. Russell, supra note 2, at 179.
23. Argentina's Lower House Approves Privatization of YPF, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Sept. 25, 1992.
24. Russell, supra note 2, at 180.
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duties and foreign exchange remittances were removed.28 And Argen-
tina's government implemented the "Argentina Plan," allowing the re-
moval of any further obstacles to developing private oil and gas
reserves.
29
In his article, The Time is Now for Full Privatization of Pemex, J. Keith
Russell explains four additional strategies that contributed to Argentina's
successful privatization of YPF:
First, foreign law firms with expertise in the [privatization process]
were consulted .... Second.... [Argentina's] government pursued a
policy of swift, outright sales whenever possible, and granted conces-
sions when outright sale was either prohibited by law or otherwise
unattainable. Third, ... [Argentina's] government ensured that po-
tential investors ... were financially solvent and possessed the tech-
nical ability to assume control of the enterprise before allowing the
transfer to go forward. Finally, the government implemented a se-
ries of measures to ensure that former government workers were not
unduly jeopardized in the transition.30
By 1993, YPF was fully privatized. 31 Shortly thereafter, Argentina ex-
perienced a 70 percent increase in its oil production. 32 Once a net im-
porter of oil, Argentina quickly became a net exporter.33 Although the
newly private companies initially cut employment by 90 percent, Argen-
tina's oil industry is now growing efficiently with 130 new upstream
businesses. 34
Additionally, foreign investors who took part in the securitization of
the newly formed companies were not directly affected by Argentina's
sometimes unstable economy because their revenues were hard currency
and because they were creditors, not to Argentina, but to offshore, corpo-
rate obligors.35 Moreover, when Argentina entered into an economic re-
cession nine months later, these newly formed companies acted as a
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Russell, supra note 2, at 181-82 (citing Julio C. Cueto-Rua, Privatization in Argen-
tina, 1 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 63, 71-75 (1994)).
31. Snyder, supra note 8, at 104.
32. Ali Moshiri, Managing Director, Upstream Latin America Business Unit in
ChevronTexaco Overseas Petroleum, Inc., Latin American Upstream: Progress
and Pitfalls, Speech to the Cambridge Energy Research Associates Conference
(Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.chevron.com/news/speeches/2002/12feb2002_moshiri.
asp.
33. Id.
34. Russell, supra note 2, at 181 (citing Bill White, Latin America's Trump Card is Oil
and Gas, Hous. CHRON., June 4, 1995, at 5C; Mary M. Shirley, Privatization and
Performance, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 669, 675 (1994)).
35. Juan Pablo De Mollein et al., Argentine Cross-Border Structured Market Still Wag-
ing Uphill Battle, STANDARD & POOR'S, Sept. 12, 2002, http://www.securitization.
net/pdf/sp-cross 091202.pdf. Repsol, now known as Repsol YPF, a Spanish oil
and gas company, was the most heavily securitized foreign company involved in
Argentina's privatization. Repsol YPF has revenue of $48.82 billion and debt
equaling $14.92 billion. Currently, most research firms suggest the company is
highly undervalued. Finance.Yahoo.com, Repsol YPF SA (REP), http://finance.
yahoo.comlq/ao?s=REP (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
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source of financial stability in the country, maintaining AAA credit rat-
ings.36 Thus, in determining whether privatization of Argentina's oil mar-
ket was the correct course of action, the short-term difficulties, including
loss of employment and reduction in salaries, seem relatively insignificant
when compared to the long-term benefits. Because privatization of YPF
reduced the government's budget deficit, created room for an efficient oil
market, and became a bedrock of financial stability, privatization of Ar-
gentina's oil market is a wonderful example of the benefits of
privatization.
IV. PRIVATIZATION OF MEXICO'S OIL INDUSTRY
If handled properly, privatization of Mexico's oil industry could have a
tremendous impact on Mexico's economy. Similar to Argentina's for-
merly state-owned YPF, Pemex owns and controls Mexico's oil indus-
try.37 Like YPF, Pemex has a great number of financial problems, and, as
a result, the government has incurred an enormous budget deficit.3 8 Al-
though there has been much debate over whether or not to privatize
Pemex, Mexico's Congress continues to reject what ultimately seems in-
evitable-the privatization of Pemex.39
Generally, advocates of privatization argue that without privatization
Pemex's oil production will continually fail to meet demand and thus con-
tinue to cause a government budget deficit. 40 In contrast, opponents of
privatization express concern about foreign profiteering and do not be-
lieve that foreign investment would trickle down to the working class. 41
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF PRIVATIZATION OF MEXICO'S
OIL INDUSTRY
Proponents of privatization contend that Mexico's excess oil reserves
remain untapped because Pemex lacks the financial backing and technol-
ogy to develop its reserves. 42 This is especially frustrating, proponents
argue, because Pemex's excess reserves are sufficient to keep thirty oil
companies busy for the next five years.43
36. Id.
37. Keneth D. Jensen, Comment, Chapatome: Interdependence and the Liberalization
of the Oil Industry in Mexico, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 81 (1993).
38. See id.; Snyder, supra note 8, at 105.
39. See Adriana Arai, Slim, Mexico Businessmen Call for Pact to Spur Growth,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 29, 2005; Contreras et al., supra note 12.
40. See Enrique Rangel & Tracey Eaton, Oil Plan Called Threat to National Treasure,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 14, 1995, at 17A; Arai, supra note 39.
41. See Tanzer, supra note 9.
42. Perhaps the most illustrative example of Mexico's failure to develop excess
reserves is its inability to effectively deep-water drill. See James Irwin, Fox Initia-
tive Could Open Mexican Gas Plays, NATURAL GAS WEEK, Sept. 26, 2005; Mexico;
A Shrinking Giant, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2005, at 4.
43. George Baker, Pemex Development Tracking Fiscal, Technological Strategies, OIL
& GAS J., May 7, 2001, at 58.
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Furthering proponents' arguments is the fact that Mexico has gener-
ated revenue, increased its gross domestic product, and paid down its
debt with relative ease, by successfully privatizing other formerly state-
owned industries. Mexico's essential goal in privatizing these industries
was "to raise revenue and ease some of the fiscal problems of the govern-
ment."' 44 During this period of privatization, revenue "totaled more than
$22 billion ... [and] more than double[d] the revenues from privatization
of any other developing country in the same period. '45 Additionally,
during the last few years, "Mexico saved an estimated $1.3 billion a year
in interest payments from its debt restructuring. '46 Also, inflation
dropped from 180 percent to less than 20 percent over the course of four
years. 47 And Mexico's gross domestic product more than doubled from
1.7 percent to 4 percent after Mexico sold its state-owned telecommunica-
tions company, Telemex.48
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRIVATIZATION OF MEXICO'S
OIL INDUSTRY
Opponents of privatization use their stance as more of a political
ploy.49 Leading the charge against privatization are nationalist Congress
members and union bosses.50 The unions generate political support for
nationalist Congress members in exchange for the power granted to
union leaders.51
These opponents of privatization choose to politically exploit the fact
that many Mexicans view Pemex as a sacred symbol of sovereignty, in-
stead of facing the harsh reality of Mexico's unstable economic condi-
tions.52 Specifically, union bosses reinforce this national sentiment by
using government funds to provide public services to Pemex workers.5 3
Consequently, Mexico's citizens are compelled to support the union
bosses in order to insure the continued receipt of the union benefits. 54
Ignoring the long-term effects, opponents of privatization point out the
short-term hardships that privatization of Pemex would bring, including
44. Pankaj Tandon, Welfare Effects of Privatization: Some Evidence From Mexico, 13
B.U. INT'L L.J. 329, 334 (1995).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 335.
47. Snyder, supra note 8, at 99.
48. Shirley, supra note 34, at 675 & 677 fig. 4.
49. See Marla Dickerson, Fear of Political Unrest Roils Mexican Markets, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2005, at C1 (stating that Mexico City's mayor is against privatization of
Pemex, which many Mexicans view as a sacred patrimony, despite Pemex's woeful
inefficiency); Grayson, supra note 12.
50. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 77 (discussing labor demonstrations and congres-
sional opposition in response to plans for privatization); Russell, supra note 2, at
200-01.
51. See Jensen, supra note 37; Russell, supra note 2, at 200-01.
52. See Dickerson, supra note 49; Pemex May Offer Shares, supra note 9.
53. Russell, supra note 2, at 200-01.
54. Id. at 201.
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job loss, salary reductions, price increases, and foreign profiteering. 55
Nevertheless, even some nationalist Congress members have admitted
that some type of foreign investment in Mexico's oil market will be neces-
sary in the future.56
Despite Mexico's adoption and implementation of free market reforms
throughout most of its economy, Pemex has been trapped in a political
whirlwind and remains outside of the privatization, process.57 As long as
Pemex controls Mexico's oil, Mexico's privatization process remains far
from complete.
C. MULTIPLE SERVICE CONTRACTS FOR OIL PRODUCTION
Although multiple service contracts for oil production are not an ade-
quate substitute for privatization, these contracts are a positive step in the
right direction. Due to Pemex's inefficiency, Mexico's oil demand will
soon outweigh its production.58 This reality will force Mexico to open up
its oil industry if it wants to avoid incurring billions of dollars of debt.
Mexico's economy would benefit greatly if the Mexican government
implemented an outright privatization of Pemex. But proponents of
privatization have failed to overcome its critics, let alone gain enough
support to amend Mexico's Constitution. Thus, Mexico is much more
likely to allow the issuance of multiple service contracts than to imple-
ment outright privatization in the near future.
Pemex's issuance of multiple service contracts, however, has many of
the same benefits as privatization. First, foreign participation in the de-
velopment of Mexico's oil would create significantly greater efficiency
and increased revenue. In addition, foreign contractors would be capable
of introducing new technologies to Mexico's oil industry, allowing for in-
creased production. And, most importantly, Mexico's government and
citizens will become more receptive to the idea of total privatization after
the benefits of foreign investment manifest by way of a healthier, more
stable Mexican economy.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, the obstacles that must be overcome in order to achieve the
privatization of Pemex are Mexico's archaic attitude of national patri-
mony and, in particular, the idea that Pemex is a symbol of Mexico's sov-
55. See Al Bassano, Mexico's Pemex Scheduled for Reshaping, Privatization, BLOOM-
BERG NEWS, July 10, 1992; James Petras, Anti-Imperialist Politics: Class Formation
and Socio-Political Action, 34 J. OF CONTEMP. ASIA 186 (2004).
56. See Mike Zellner, Pemex Takes Stock, LATIN TRADE, May 2003; Nick Benequista
& Loren Steffy, Mexico's Pemex Torn as History Clashes With Foreign Investment,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 26, 2004.
57. Russell, supra note 2, at 196.
58. See Catherine Bremer, Mexico Says Welcomes Natgas Storage Hub Proposals,
REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 31, 2005; Mexico Says Could Pump Extra 100,000 bpd if
Needed, REUTERS NEWS, Feb. 19, 2003.
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ereignty. 59 It is this ideology of nationalist petro-pride-expressed
through Mexico's oil unions and opportunistic politicians-that has
blocked privatization legislation and sought to maintain status quo at the
expense of Mexico's citizens. 60 As a consequence, the inefficient oil in-
dustry is both dragging the rest of Mexico's economy down and sup-
pressing Mexico's working class. 61
While the issuance of multiple service contracts is encouraging, full
privatization is the only economic policy that has proven to be successful
in Latin American countries such as Argentina and Mexico itself.62 Mex-
ico would undoubtedly benefit from Pemex's privatization because it
would reduce its budget deficit and increase capital investment. 63 By in-
creasing capital investment, Mexico could develop the technologies nec-
essary to make use of its excess oil reserves, including technologies that
would allow for deep-water drilling.64 Arguments against privatization,
like those emphasizing short-term unemployment, obviously ignore
privatization's long-term benefits.65
Once Mexico does decide to privatize Pemex, and it ultimately will, it is
important that Mexico follows Argentina's methodology. Therefore,
Mexico's government should hire foreign law firms with expertise in the
privatization process as consultants.66 Additionally, Mexico's govern-
ment should pursue a policy of swift, outright sales whenever possible,
and grant concessions whenever an outright sale is either prohibited by
law or some other obstacle.67 Furthermore, Mexico's government should
make sure that foreign investors are solvent and have the capacity to as-
sume control of the enterprise before allowing a sale to take place.68 Fi-
nally, Mexico's government must implement a policy to ensure that
former government workers are not unduly jeopardized in the
transition.69
Because Mexico would benefit from a stronger economy if it privatized
Pemex, it is up to proponents of privatization to inform Mexico's citizens
about the benefits of privatization. Without an understanding of these
benefits, Mexico's citizens will continue to view the idea of privatizing
Pemex as handing over Mexico's oil to foreign investors.
59. Russell, supra note 2, at 201.
60. See Pemex May Offer Shares, supra note 9; Murphy, supra note 1, at 96.
61. See Russell, supra note 2, at 201-02 (citing Dudley Althaus, Mexico's State of
Gloom, Hous. CHRON., July 14, 1996, at 1A; George W. Grayson, Pemex Chiefs
Successful Innovations Keeping Detractors at Bay, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 11, 1996, at
5C).
62. See Tandon, supra note 44, at 334-37; See Snyder, supra note 8, at 98-99 & 107-08.
63. Russell, supra note 2, at 202 (citing Thomas J. Casey & Simone Wu, Telecommuni-
cations Privatizations: An Overview, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 781, 786
(1994)).
64. See Irwin, supra note 42; Mexico; A Shrinking Giant, supra note 42.
65. See Bassano, supra note 55; Mexico; A Shrinking Giant, supra note 42.
66. See Russell, supra note 2, at 181-82.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
